Marife Turkish Journal of Religious Studies

Abstract

The critique of Ibn ‘Ata Allah al-Iskandari (d. 709/1309), as an important Sufi author,
concerning the proofs of God’s existence is quite remarkable not only from the point of
Sufism but also from the point of philosophy of religion. His critique is based on his own
notion of mystical knowledge (ma’rifah). For him, the true way to know God is witnessing
(mushahadah), which is also the way of Sufis. The way of witnessing takes precedence
over the way of reasoning (istidlal) which he accepted to be belonging to theologians
(mutakallimun) and philosophers and which weaker than the way of witnessing. The way
of witnessing has a certainty that reserves no room for proof.
Another reason for al-Iskandari’s critique of proofs concerning Divine Existence is to be
found in his distinction between true being and the shadow being. According to him, the
real being is God Himself, and the shadow being is the things other than Him. In this case,
it is not appropriate to establish shadow beings as proofs and thus as basis for the
existence of real being. As a matter of fact, it is not God whose existence must be proven,
but the things other than him. The position of al-Iskandari in relation to the proofs reminds us the views of fidelist
phylosophers about the proofs; however, there are some differences the most important
of which is that the proofs of the fidelists depend on epistemological reasons, whereas alIskandari’s
critique depends on the ontological basis.